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Contracts: Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck: Exposing the
Fatal Flaw in the "Christian Principle" of Tort

Liability for Breach of Good Faith*
Introduction
Seldom does any element of a United States Supreme Court decision go
unnoticed for long. Even the tiniest hint of dicta is food for hungry legal
scholars. However, Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck' is an exception. Although
the opinion has been cited several hundred times since it was rendered in
1985, courts and legal scholars have ignored an underlying determination
in the case. The determination is not precedent because the subject matter
is left to the states. It is not dicta because the determination was necessary
to the Court's ultimate decision. That underlying determination-that the
contract duty of good faith has no extra-contractual element upon which
to base a tort-is the subject of this note.
This note first discusses the importance of the tort/contract characterization, then describes the duty of good faith as a common law and
statutory element of all contracts. It summarizes the history of tort liability
for breach of the duty of good faith as the tort developed in the insurance
context, giving rise to Oklahoma's seminal case, Christian v. American
Home Assurance Co.2
The note then describes the flaw in the reasoning of Christian and its
antecedents, as exposed by the United States Supreme Court in AllisChalmers. Two subsequent United States Supreme Court cases, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts and Pilot Life Insurance Co.
* Written by Carolyn S. Smith. The Section of Business Law of the American Bar
Association awarded first prize in its 1989 Student Writing Contest to an article comprised
of this note and the author's prior note, Contracts:Rodgers v. Tecumesh Bank: Reevaluating
the "Christian Principle" of Tort Liability for Breach of Good Faith, 42 OKLA. L. REV.
291 (1989). A version of the winning article is published as Smith, Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck:
The United States Rejects Tort Liability for Breach of Good Faith, 43 CONSUMER FIN. L.
QUARTERLY REP. 258 (1989).

1. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
2. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977), amended
(1978). The tort has been the subject of extensive comment nationwide. For prior comment
on Oklahoma's tort, see Woodard, Punitive Damages for Bad Faith Breach of an Insurance
Contract: It's Unconstitutional, 54 OKiLA. B.J. 1125 (1983) (questioning the constitutionality
of singling out the insurance industry); Koss, The Constitutionality of Awarding Punitive
Damages against an Insurance Companyfor Bad Faith:A Reply, 54 OKLA. B.J. 1999 (1983)
(defending the constitutionality of the tort); Note, Punitive Damagesfor Breach of Insurance
Contract, 3 OKLA. CiTY U.L. REv. 280 (1978) (examining the new tort); Note, Tortious
Breach of Contract in Oklahoma, 20 TULSA L.J. 233 (1984) (discussing Oklahoma's conflict
between tort and contract); Note, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian
v. American Home Assurance Corp. [sic], 13 TULsA L.J. 605 (1978) (discussing the elements
of bad-faith breach).
3. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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v. Dedeaux,4 clarify the Court's description of the flaw. The note then
discusses how the existence of the flaw has impaired the Oklahoma Supreme Court's ability to properly apply and restrict the tort.
The note concludes that the United States Supreme Court was correct:
Tort liability for breach of the duty of good faith does violate traditional
tort/contract distinctions and cannot be justified by the policy concerns
inherent in insurance contracts.
The Tort/Contract Characterlzatio,
Whether an action for breach of the duty of good faith sounds in tort
or contract directly affects the available remedies.s Traditionally, breach
of a contractual duty has not given rise to an action in tort for consequential or punitive damages. 6 Instead, the rule established in Hadley v.
Baxendale7 defined the normal contract damages: the injured party could
recover only those damages which were foreseeable and contemplated by
the parties when the contract was made. 8 The Hadley rule is reflected in
an Oklahoma statute which allows no punitive damages in contract. 9
Another statute allows only the amount due, with interest, as damages for
breach of an obligation to pay money only.10
Furthermore, section 1-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
expressly limits damages which may be awarded under the Code for breach
of the duty of good faith." Under section 1-106, damages are limited to
4. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
5. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958)
(plaintiff allowed tort damages, but also allowed the more lenient statute of limitations for
contracts); Lewis v. Farmers Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1983) (insured allowed two-year
statute of limitations for tort although recovery under this policy was limited to one year),
See also Note, Actions: Tortious Breach of Contract,A Plaintiff'sDilemma, 26 OKLA. L.

Rav. 249 (1973) (analyzing the choice of statutes of limitation).
6. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Smith, 27 Okla. 830, 115 P. 347, 350 (1911) ("statute fixing
liability for exemplary damages does so upon those obligations, not arising from contract,
and is in harmony with the common law on this subject."). See generally Sullivan, Punitive
Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN.
L. REv. 207 (1977) (discussing the historical distinction between tort and contract remedies
and the breakdown of this distinction),
7. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
8. As stated by one author, "[i]n the case of a breach of contract, the goal of
compensation is ... the awarding 'of a sum Which is the equivalent of performance of the
bargain-the attempt to place the plaintiff in the position he would be in if the contract
had been fulfilled." C. McComcK, LAW OF DAMAoEs 560-61 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 351-55 (1979); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COL. L. REv. 1145, 1200-10 (1970).
9. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 21 (1981).
10. 23 OKLA, STAT. § 22 (1981). See also S. WILLISTON & 0. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS
FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 853-54 (rev. ed. 1938). One commentator interprets this rule to be in direct conflict with the Hadley rule because it is so
restrictive. See Freemon, Reasonable and ForeseeableDamagesfor Breach of an Insurance
Contract, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 108 (1985).
11. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1988).
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those necessary to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as the
party would have been in if the contract had been performed. Consequential, special and penal damages are expressly excluded, except where
2
they are specifically provided for by the U.C.C. or by other rules of law.
Therefore, if the duty of good faith is nothing more than a contract
duty, simple breach of that duty in Oklahoma should subject the breaching
party to no more than contract damages. If, however, the duty of good
faith lies outside the contract, breach of the duty could subject the
breaching party to the full array of tort damages, including punitive
damages.
The Duty of Good Faith
The Common-Law Duty of Good Faith
The common law recognizes an implied covenant of good faith in every
contract. 3 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has noted that the freedom to
contract is not absolute: "[T]he interests of the people of Oklahoma are
not best served by a marketplace of cut-throat business dealings where the
4
law of the jungle is thinly clad in contractual lace."'
However, at common law it is not clear whether the duty of good faith,
while it lies within the contract, also lies outside the contract so that
breach of the duty could be actionable in tort. The common law does
provide that if a tort is committed in a contractual situation, the aggrieved
party may forego the right to sue on the contract and sue on the tort
instead: "[A]Ithough there are some few cases not in harmony, the rule
under the great weight of authority is well established that, where a breach
of contract is permeated with tort, the injured person may elect to waive
the contract and recover in tort. . . ."" The contract is not considered
the basis of the tort action; the contract is merely the means by which the
6
tort is perpetrated.
12. Id. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-710, 2-715 (1988).
13. "Every contract contains an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything
which will destroy or injure other party's right to receive fruits of the contract." Wright v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 176 Okla. 274, 277, 54 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1935) (citing Kirke
LaShelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933)).
14. Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Okla. 1985).
15. Hobbs v. Smith, 117 Okla. 830, 115 P. 347, 350 (1911). Another line of cases
following Jackson v. Central Torpedo Co., 117 Okla. 245, 246 P. 426 (1926), would require
the plaintiff to proceed under the two-year statute of limitations for tort actions rather than
the five-year statute for contract actions. The conflict between these two rules is discussed
in Note, Actions: Tortious Breach of Contract, A Plaintiff's Dilemma, 26 OKLA. L. REv.
249 (1973). See also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768 (1939)
(gas company operating as public utility has extra-contractual duty to provide safe, continuous supply of fuel).

16. For example, in a contract for the purchase of a car, an actionable tort for fraud
arises if the seller misrepresents the condition of the car. The purchase contract has set the
stage for the fraud, but a misrepresentation of present fact made to induce another to act

to his detriment is fraud whether or not a contract is involved, The action for fraud is said,
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The Duty of Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code
The U.C.C. imposes a statutory duty of good faith in every commercial
contract. Like the common law, the U.C.C. does not say whether this
duty of good faith lies only within the contract or whether it also lies
outside the contract.' 7 Section 1-203 of the U.C.C. simply states that
"[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement.""8 Section 1-201(19) defines good
faith as "honesty in fact," a purely objective test. 9 Section 1-102(3)
prohibits contracting parties from disclaiming the duty of good faith,
although they may set reasonable standards by which it can be measured. 0
The Duty of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts
The idea that the duty of good faith could lie both within a contract

and outside the contract originated with insurance contracts. 2' Tort damages for breach of the duty of good faith were first awarded in third-

party insurance contracts. 22 In this generic fact pattern, Joe Consumer
buys liability insurance. The contract gives the insurer the right and the
duty to represent Joe in settlement negotiations with third parties to whom
he may be liable. After an accident, the injured third party offers to settle

therefore, to exist outside the contract. See Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453
P.2d 551 (1969). In MSA Tubular Products, Inc. v. First Bank & Trust Co., Yale, Okla.,
869 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1989), a bank was held liable for similar fraudulent misrepresentation in a credit report, although there was no contractual relationship with the plaintiff.
According to the Fourth Circuit, "South Carolina is the only state in the nation which
allows punitive damages for conduct which does not give rise to an independent tort claim."
Edens v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 858 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1988).
One test for the tort/contract determination is the distinction between nonfeasance and
misfeasance. Complete nonperformance of a promise is breach of contract, but defective
performance may be a tort. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92,
at 658-62 (5th ed. 1984).
See also Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1975) (consummation of
the contract does not preclude recovery for fraudulent inducement of the contract). See
generally Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion
of Legal Change, 61 MIN. L. REv. 207 (1977) (discussing breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
and independent, wilful torts arising from contract). Cf. Note, Punitive Damages in Contract
Actions-Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WAsHBURN L.J. 86 (1980) (discussing
exceptions to the general rule).
17. For a strong argument that the duty of good faith as defined by the U.C.C. is
intended to be directive, not remedial, see Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing and the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 539, 550 n.75
(1987).

18. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1988).
19. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1988).
20. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1988).
21. See Note, Contracts: Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank: Reevaluating the "Christian Principle" of Tort Liabilityfor Breach of Good Faith, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 291 (1989) (overview
of the history of the tort).
22, See, e.g., Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 46 P. 916 (Okla. 1935) (establishing
the third-party tort in Oklahoma).
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within the policy limits, relieving Joe of any further liability. However,
the insurer chooses to risk a larger award by rejecting the settlement offer.
The third party sues for more than the policy limit and wins. Joe is now
liable for the amount over the policy limit.
If Joe sues the insurer in tort for breach of the duty of good faith, he
may recover the full amount of the judgment. The tort is said to be based
on the extra-contractual "agency" duty, 23 which requires the insurer to
protect Joe's interest even to the detriment of its own interest.
In recent years, courts have extended the tort to first-party insurance
contracts in which this special relationship does not exist. 24 For example,
Joe Consumer buys insurance which provides benefits directly to him
should disaster strike. When disaster does strike, the insurer, without good
reason, either ignores his claim or refuses to pay. Because Joe's bills pile
up and other creditors may pressure him, he may begin to suffer emotionally as well as financially. Even if the insurer pays Joe part or all of
the benefits due, not even the full amount can completely compensate Joe
for the hardships caused by the insurer's unreasonable delay.
If Joe files an action in tort for breach of the duty of good faith, he
may recover for all losses he has suffered and for his emotional distress.
He may recover punitive damages if the insurer's refusal to promptly pay
the benefits was malicious. The tort is said to be based on the insurer's
25
extra-contractual duty to pay the policy benefits promptly.
Many states, including Oklahoma, trace their first-party tort to a California case, Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company.26 When Gruenberg's
insured building burned, he was charged with arson, partially because of
the accusations of the insurer's private investigator. The insurer then
demanded that he submit to an examination and produce documents as
required by the state insurance code. 27 Gruenberg refused to do so while
charges were pending. When the charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause, Gruenberg told the insurer he was now ready to be examined.
The insurer denied liability because Gruenberg had not submitted to the
examination earlier.
Gruenberg sought both compensatory and punitive damages for the
"outrageous conduct and bad faith" of the insurer. 2 The trial court
sustained a demurrer to the complaint, citing an earlier case with similar
facts. That case had affirmed that the insured could not recover unless he
had complied with the terms of the contract. 29 The California Supreme
Court, citing third-party insurance cases, held that a cause of action in
23. See, e.g., Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708
(1924) (proposing the agency duty as a basis for the tort).
24. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973) (establishing the first-party tort).
25. Id.
26. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
27. CAL. INS. CoDE § 2070 (West 1972).
28. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1035.
29. Id. at 1036 (citing Hickman v. London Assurance Co., 184 Cal. 524, 195 P. 45
(1920)).
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tort existed for an insurance company's breach of the duty of good faith
even if the insured had not fulfilled his contract obligations.3 0
The court acknowledged that the duty imposed in the third-party context-to accept reasonable settlements-was different from the duty in the
first-party context-to pay policy proceeds promptly. Nonetheless, the
court reasoned that these two responsibilities were "merely two different
aspects of the same duty" to act in good faith in the discharge of
contractual responsibilities. The court reasoned that because the duty was
imposed by law instead of by the terms of the contract, it was a nonconsensual duty rather than a consensual one. Therefore, breach of the duty
3
would lie in tort. '
The court's treatment of subordinate issues was conflicting. On the one
hand, the court held that noninsurer defendants could not be held liable
for breach of the duty of good faith because they were strangers to the
contract.3 2 This holding emphasized the tort's contractual nature. On the
other hand, the court held that the insured's breach of his contractual
duty did not excuse the insurer's breach because the insurer's duty was
unconditional and independent of the insured's performance. 33 This holding emphasized the noncontractual nature of the tort. It also ignored the
fact that the insured's duty was imposed by the insurance code just as the
insurer's duty was.
The lone dissenter made several observations germane to this note's
discussion. 34 First, the dissent noted the lack of fiduciary duty in the firstparty context. 35 Second, the dissent noted that because all fire insurance
policies issued in California are written by the legislature, they cannot be
adhesion contracts. 6 Therefore, the dissent could find no extra-contractual
duty upon which to base a tort. Third, the dissent noted that, although
the words "maliciously" and "wilfully" conveyed the plaintiff's outrage,
the elements of a tort had not been proved. 3 Fourth, the dissent noted
that prior case law would not excuse the insured's failure to submit to
examination-the duty of good faith should be a two-way street. The
dissent concluded that the majority's holding directly violated the insurance
code38 and would allow plaintiffs to ignore their own obligations, no

30. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1036-37 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), and Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.
2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958)).
31. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037.
32. Id. at 1038-39.
33. Id. at 1040. The court also noted that even if the insurer's performance was dependent
on the insured's performance, the insured's failure to submit to examination was excused
because it was induced by the insurer's bad conduct. Id. at n.9.
34. Id. at 1042-49.
35. Id. at 1045.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1044-45.
38. Id. at 1047-49. Section 2071 of the California Insurance Code states that "[no suit
or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss4/12

NO TES

1989]

matter how well defined, yet demand performance by the insurance companyA9
Thus, Gruenberg established a tort aimed at one specific class of contracting parties. Although insurers grumble, a general attitude prevails
that the tort is an appropriate recognition of the special relationship
between insurer and insured.
Oklahoma'sFirst-PartyTort
Oklahoma adopted Gruenberg in a 1977 case, Christian v. American
Home Insurance Co. 40 The facts of Christian are an excellent example of
the typical first-party fact pattern. Christian purchased disability insurance,
then became permanently and totally disabled in an accident covered by
that policy. He presented proof of the accident to the insurer, but the
insurer refused to pay benefits and refused to tell him why benefits were
denied. He sued the insurer for breach of contract and sought the maximum disability benefits, plus interest. Although the insurer defended its
became obvious during the
conduct vigorously, the lack of a valid defense
42
trial. 41 The trial court held for Christian.
Christian then filed a second action, this one in tort for breach of the
duty of good faith. He sought compensatory damages, damages for mental
suffering and distress, punitive damages, and all attorney fees and litigation
costs of the prior action. The trial court sustained the insurer's motion
for summary judgment, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that a 43tort action for breach of the duty of good faith exists in
Oklahoma.
The supreme court reasoned that the insurer was a quasi-public company
in a special relationship with the insured. 44 The court also4 observed that
the insurer had a statutory duty to pay benefits promptly.
The court rejected the insurer's argument that the agency relationship
created by an insurer's control of litigation against the insured did not
exist. 46 The court also rejected the insurer's argument that, according to

law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with..
Id. at 1048 (quoting Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 97 (1884)).
39. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1048-49.
40. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977), amended (1978).

41. Id. at 900.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 904.
44. Id. at 902.
45. Id. at 903. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 4405(A)(8) (Supp. 1984) requires that all individual

accident and health policies contain a standard clause stating that indemnities will be paid
as soon as the insurer receives written proof of the loss. Another statute, 36 OKLA. STAT.

§ 4505 (1981), extends this protection to beneficiaries of group policies.
The Christian court's observation that the insurer had a statutory duty to pay benefits

promptly was in error. See text accompanying note 86.
46. Christian, 577 P.2d at 904.
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an Oklahoma statute, 47 the remedy for breach of an obligation to pay
"money only" was the amount due with interest. 4 Furthermore, the court
rejected two federal court decisions. 49 These decisions had rejected tort
damages because tort damages were barred by state statute.50

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not questioned the validity of Gruenberg.1' However, when the United States Supreme Court examined the tort
established by Gruenberg, it concluded that a basis for the tort does not
2
exist in the first-party insurance contract.1
The United States Supreme Court'sAssessment of the First-PartyTort

Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck
Although the Court would not normally address a state's definition of
a tort, the Court addressed Wisconsin's definition in Allis-Chalmers v.
Lueck53 because the insurance policy at issue in the case was part of a
collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a union. The
insurance plan was administered by a private insurance company.
The ultimate question before the Court was whether the action for

breach of the duty of good faith could be heard as a tort in state court.
If the action was merely a contract action arising out of the collective
bargaining agreement, it was preempted by section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA). 54 Therefore, a preliminary question
before the Court, and the question relevant here, was whether the duty
of good faith was only a contractual duty, or whether the duty could
5
support an action in tort.
47. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 22 (1971).
48. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903.
49. See Renfroe v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Okla. 1969)
(action for money damages only, under 23 OKLA. STAT. §§ 9, 22, 96); Ledford v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Okla. 1970) (no punitive damages because action is
based on and arises out of contract). The Christian court distinguished these cases because
they "presuppose that the obligation of an insurance company is for the payment of money
only." 577 P.2d at 903.
50. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 22 (1981) states that the remedy for
breach of an obligation to pay money only is the amount due, with interest. 23 OKLA. STAT.
§ 9 (Supp. 1986) allows tort damages for "breach of an obligation not arising from contract."
51. For a recent application ofChristian, see Everaard v. Hartfort Accident & Indem.
Co., 842 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1988).
52. See Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 206. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA),
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), states that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may
be brought in any district court of the United States . . . ." See generally Shaller, The
Availability of Punitive Damages in Breach of Contract Actions Under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 50 GEO. VASH. L. REv. 219 (1982) (punitive damages
unavailable under section 301); Coleman, Muddy Waters: Allis-Chalmers and the Federal
Policy Favoring Labor Arbitration, 44 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 345 (1987) (overview of the
labor law context of Allis-Chalmers).
55. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212-13.
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The facts of Allis-Chalmers have a familiar ring. After Lueck was injured
on the job, the insurer allegedly withheld his benefits periodically without
just cause.16 He suffered physical and emotional distress and incurred
attorney fees because of the delays, but he was eventually paid in full.
Instead of complying with the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement, Lueck sued his employer and the insurer in
Wisconsin state court. He sought tort damages, including punitive damages, for breach of the duty of good faith.1
The trial court held that Lueck's claim could be brought in federal court
under section 301 as a contract action but that it could not be brought in
state court as a tort. 8 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, but
addressed other areas of labor law instead of the tort/contract question.5 9
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.60 The court held that the suit
did not arise under section 301 because breach of the duty of good faith
was not breach of contract. 6 1 The court emphasized the fiduciary relation62
ship between the parties and Wisconsin's tradition of regulating insurers.
The court noted that the insurer had ultimately paid the claim, thereby
fulfilling its contract, but that it could still be liable in tort for unreasonable delay. The court reasoned that while the insurer had violated its duty
of good faith imposed by the state insurance laws, it had not violated the
63
contract.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first defined the narrow
preemptory effect of section 301. The Court noted that section 301 did
not preempt a state rule merely because it related in some way to a
64
provision in a contract, or more generally to the parties to that contract.
Only those state rules that did not exist independently of the contract
would be preempted by federal law.65 Therefore, even if the duty of good
faith existed both within the contract and apart from it, Lueck's action
would be allowed to proceed as a tort in state court.
The Supreme Court next considered the origin and the scope of the
Wisconsin tort. The Court noted that nothing in Wisconsin law indicated
56. Id. at 207.
57. Id. at 206.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 206 n.3. The court of appeals held that the action was preempted by federal
law because Allis-Chalmers' conduct was arguably an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
60. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 207.
61. Id. at 220.
62. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699, 704 (1984), rev'd
sub noma. Allis Chalmers v. Leuck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
63. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213.
64. Id. at 213. The Court acknowledged that in some situations, the employee could
pursue both contract and non-contract actions arising out of the same facts. See Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (black employee alleging discriminatory firing
could file Title VII action); Peabody-Galion v. A. V. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981)
(wrongful discharge in violation of Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act not preempted).
65. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 214-15.
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that the tort was anything more than a contract violation. 6 The Court
unanimously concluded that the Wisconsin court's claim that the tort was
independent of the contract meant no more than that the implicit duty to
act in good faith differed from the explicit contractual duty to pay. 61
Therefore, the Court's answer to the preliminary question was that the
duty of good faith lay only within the contract. The duty contained no
element apart from the contract upon which to attach tort liability. Accordingly, the action for breach of the duty was a contract action preempted by section 301.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts
Subsequent cases have further clarified the Court's reasoning in AllisChalmers. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts," decided
just months after Allis-Chalmers, the Court addressed more directly the
policy arguments made by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The preemptive federal statute in question was the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).6 9 Preemption under ERISA is similar to
that under section 301 of the LMRA (addressed in Allis Chalmers), but a
savings clause in ERISA states that ERISA will not relieve any person
from any state law which "regulates insurance."70
In Metropolitan, an insurer had failed to include in individual insurance
policies a provision mandated by Massachusetts statute.7' The Massachusetts Attorney General brought suit on behalf of the state's residents.
The
72
insurer asserted that the cause of action was preempted by ERISA.
The Court held that the attorney general's cause of action was not
preempted because laws regulating the terms of insurance policies are laws
which regulate insurance.7 3 The Court noted that the statute in question
66. Id. at 217.
67. Id. at 216.
68. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974).
70. Section 301 of the LMRA preempts "suits for violation of contracts." 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1982). ERISA supersedes any state laws that "relate to any employee benefit plan."
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1974). The breadth of the ERISA preemption was underscored
in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). Nonetheless, the Court noted in
Metropolitan that "the presumption is against preemption." Metropolitan, 471 U.S. at 741.
Ignoring the impact of the ERISA's savings clause in the present context, ERISA may be
more preemptive in practice than the LMRA. See Nelson, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux:
The Supreme Court's Federalization of Employee Benefit Law, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 507

(1988).
71. MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B (Law. Co-op. 1975), requires that every general
health policy or employee health-care plan that covers hospital and surgical expenses also
provide certain minimum mental health care benefits if the policy covers a Massachusetts
resident.
72. Metropolitan, 471 U.S. at 734.
73. Id. at 758. The Court quoted from an earlier case: "The relationship between insurer
and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, its interpretation, and
enforcement-these were the core of the 'business of insurance.' . . . Statutes aimed at
protecting or regulating this [insured/insurer] relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws
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was an integral part of the insured/insurer relationship, that it regulated
74
the allocation of risk, and that it was directed specifically to insurers.
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux
After Metropolitan, commentators speculated that the savings clause in
ERISA would foreclose preemption of an action analogous to Allis-Chalmers brought under ERISA instead of the LMRA. 71 If, as the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had argued, the state's need to regulate insurance companies was the basis for tort liability for breach of good faith, then the
tort should be saved to the states under ERISA. Nonetheless, in Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 76 the Court preempted under ERISA an action
for breach of good faith factually similar to that in Allis-Chalmers.
In Pilot Life, the Court considered the same factors it had considered
in Metropolitan for determining whether the tort for breach of the duty
of good faith concerned the business of insurance. First, the Court noted
that the tort did nothing to allocate risk. Second, it determined that any
connection between the tort and the insurer/insured relationship was "attenuated at best" because the tort was no more integral to that relationship
than any general contract law is integral to a contract.7 7 Finally, when the
Court surveyed the history of Mississippi's tort for breach of the duty of
good faith, the Court found nothing in the tort itself to foreclose its use
in any breach of contract even though the Mississippi Supreme Court had
identified the tort with the insurance industry. 78
Therefore, PilotLife emphatically reaffirmed the position the Court had
taken in Allis-Chalmers: The duty of good faith is nothing more than a
contract duty, and tort liability for breach of the duty cannot be justified
by a state's desire to regulate the insurance industry.

regulating the 'business of insurance."' Id. at 743 (emphasis by the court). The Court also
referred to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, 1012(a) (1988), which provides
that "[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the
laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." Id.
at 744 n.21.
74. Id. at 743. The Court used three criteria it has previously developed in Union Labor
Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), to interpret the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
"business of insurance": 1) does the practice transfer or spread a policy-holder's risk; 2) is
the practice integral to the policy relationship between insurer and insured, and 3) is the
practice limited to the insurance industry. Metropolitan, 471 U.S. at 743.
75. See, e.g., Engel, ERISA: To Preempt or Not to Preempt, That Is A Question!, 22
ToRT & INs. L.J. 431 (1987).

76. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
77. Id. at 50-51.
78. Id. at 49-51. Mississippi's first-party tort relies on the reasoning of Gruenberg and
Christian. See, e.g., Gulf At. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1981). The
Court also referenced a 1926 case, American Ry. Express Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 107
So. 761 (1926), in which punitive damages were awarded for a finance company's failure to
cable money to the plaintiff. Bailey relied on the traditional common law choice between
tort and contract. This choice also exists under Oklahoma law. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text.
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To summarize these three cases, Allis-Chalmers established that the duty
of good faith has no extra-contractual element upon which to base a tort.
Metropolitan and Pilot Life taken together established that the tort does
not address the policy concerns underlying insurance contracts.
Analysis
The Validity of Applying Allis-Chalmers in the Present Context

Allis-Chalmers and its progeny cannot be reconciled with Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co. or Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., nor

can the cases be adequately distinguished. Gruenberg and Christian held
that the duty of good faith can support a tort because the duty is based

on extra-contractual policy concerns inherent in the insurer-insured relationship. Conversely, Allis-Chalmers and Pilot Life held that the duty has

no extra-contractual element and does not address these policy concerns.
The first impulse would be to say that labor law and insurance law are

too disparate to allow a comparison. However, the preliminary tort/
contract question is more fundamental than either the insurance law or
labor law label. Allis-Chalmers and Pilot Life were insurance cases even
though they arose in the labor context. Their fact patterns fit the typical

first-party insurance contract described in this note. 79 The Wisconsin and
Mississippi Supreme Courts derived their reasoning for the tort from the
Gruenberg decision, which was based on the special relationship between
the parties and on state regulation of the insurance industry. 0 The United
States Supreme Court specifically addressed these policy concerns.

Furthermore, the focus on labor law in Allis-Chalmers and Pilot Life
does not detract from the usefulness of these cases in the present context
and may actually enhance it. The Court's stated reluctance to preempt
unless absolutely necessary reinforces the validity of its conclusion that
the duty of good faith lay only in contract. The Court was emphatic that
if an extra-contractual duty could be found, that duty could be the basis
for an independent tort.8'
79. One slight difference in the fact patterns is interesting in light of traditional contract
law: In Allis-Chalmers the insured received his benefits before he sued; Christian did not
receive his benefits until after the court ordered them paid. According to the reasoning of
W. KEETON, supra note 16, the misfeasance in Allis-Chalmers would more likely be considered
a tort than the nonfeasance in Christian.
An analogy can be drawn between Oklahoma's damages statutes and the federal labor
laws: there can be no tort damages (or state action) if the action is in contract, but there
can be tort damages (or state action) if the action has an independent basis outside the
contract, even if it also has a basis within the contract.
80. See generally Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368
(1978); Gulf At. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1981). Ironically, Gruenberg
relied in turn on Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931), an early
Wisconsin third-party insurance case in which tort liability for breach of the duty of good
faith was recognized.
81. The Supreme Court reemphasized yet again the narrowness of its Allis-Chalmers
holding in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). In that case, the
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Juxtaposition of Metropolitan and Pilot Life underscores the Court's
distinction between extra-contractual imposition of a duty (in which policy
concerns may play a major role) and contractual performance of that
duty.
The Flawed Reasoning Underlying the Tort
Courts which accept Gruenberg do not recognize the fatal difference
between third-party and first-party insurance situations. Nor do they recognize the significance of that difference when the third-party tort is
applied to first-party situations.
In the third-party liability contract, the insurer's duty is an agency duty,
sometimes referred to as a fiduciary duty, to represent the insured's interest
even at the risk of acting contrary to its own interest. Fiduciary duties
have long been recognized as existing outside of contract and giving rise
to tort liability. But those duties do not exist in the first-party insurance
contract. Instead, the duty to pay benefits in exchange for the duty to
pay premiums is nothing more than an arms-length bargain between insurer
and an insured, an adversarial relationship common to all contracts. s 7 Each
party has the implied contract duty of good faith, but without more,
neither has an additional duty to the other which could support a tort.
In spite of this fundamental difference between the first-party and the
third-party situations, courts still try to justify the tort in first-party
contracts. Typically, their arguments focus on the insurer/insured relationship. In addition to the flawed analogy to the third-party situation,
the arguments fall generally into one or more of five categories. None of
these arguments can withstand close scrutiny.
First, courts emphasize that, unlike contract provisions, the insurer's
duty of good faith is "imposed by law." Insurance codes commonly require
a standard clause in which the insurer promises to pay-proceeds promptly. 3
In addition, the California Insurance Code requires a standard clause in
which the insured promises to cooperate with the insurer's investigation. 4
The Gruenberg court did not explain why it considered one duty "imposed
by law" a contractual duty and the other, also "imposed by law," a duty
outside the contract upon which to base a tort. Nonetheless, because of

Court refused to preempt a worker's action in tort for retaliatory discharge after filing a
workers' compensation claim. The Court stated that even if the state law claim and the
labor law claim required addressing "precisely the same facts," the state law claim would
not be preempted if it could be resolved outside of the collective-bargaining agreement. Id.
at 1883.
82. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 216. The Kansas Supreme Court recognized the adversarial nature of the relationship in Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan.
914, 611 P.2d 149, 155 (1980). See also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah
1985) (third-party and first-party situations are not analogous).
83. See 36 OKLA. STAT. §§ 4405(A)(8), 4505 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
84. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 2070-71 (West 1972).
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that distinction, the insured was allowed to breach his legal duty, yet
recover in tort when the insurer breached its legal duty.85
In addition, the statutes referenced in Gruenberg and Christian required
only that the insurer promise to pay the proceeds promptly. The California
Supreme Court held recently that there is no private cause of action under
the statute which actually creates a duty "imposed by law" to pay insurance proceeds promptly.8 6 To require by statute that the insurer promise
to pay the contracted benefit may indeed impose a duty outside the contract
upon which to base tort7 liability, but that duty is to make the promise,
not to pay the benefits.1
The United States Supreme Court clarified this distinction in Metropolitan and Pilot Life. The Court concluded in Metropolitan that failure to
include a required provision in an insurance contract can be an extracontractual tort. However, the Court concluded in Pilot Life that failure
to perform according to a contract provision, whether imposed by law or
not, is simple breach of contract.
Second, courts refer to the duty of good faith as "implied in law." The
duty is implied by both the U.C.C. and common law. In this sense, the
obligation is based on the principle that the law assumes that a person
promises to do what he ought to do. While contract liability arises from
the contract, the implied duty arises from the liability. 88 Because the duty
does not arise from the consent of the parties, it is not a true contract.
Instead, this duty is called a "constructive contract," or "quasi-contract."8 9 However, the duty is still enforceable only as a contract duty. 90
85. See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1040. A trend toward "comparative bad "faith" may be
developing in California. See Mercedes Benz of N.A. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
No. CV-86-2371 (D. Cal. May 26, 1989) (insurer recovered $4.5 million in punitive damages
for insured's breach of good faith); Cal. Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 173 Cal. App.
3d 274, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985) (comparative fault principles of tort law should apply to
bad faith). See also Shipstead & Thomas, Comparative and Reverse Bad Faith: Insured's
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Affirmative Defense or
Counterclaim, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 215 (1987). Comparative fault is antithetical to the policy
arguments such as adhesion and unfair bargaining power used to justify this tort.
86. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250
Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
87. The Seventh Circuit, interpreting Allis-Chalmers, held that if a statute merely instructs
a contracting party to honor a contract, then the statute does not provide a sufficient basis
for an independent action because it invokes no duty other than that already imposed by
the contract. National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 824 (7th Cir. 1986). But see
36 OKLA. STAT. § 1222 (1986), which now requires an insurer to settle claims in good faith.
This statute is part of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, which does not provide
a private cause of action. Instead, the Act is enforceable by the insurance commissioner.
Section 1219 now provides recovery in contract for failure to pay policy proceeds promptly.
36 OKLA. STAT. § 1219 (1986).
88. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 293 (5th ed. 1979).
89. Id.
90. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 681
(Okla. 1983), stated that "[ain action is one ex contractu when it is derived from (a) an
express promise, (b) a promise implied in fact or (c) a promise implied in law." Id. at 684.
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Third, courts find a "quasi-public" nature of insurance companies by
drawing an analogy to public utilities. Public utilities and private companies performing public service duties have long been held to a duty
higher than that of the average contracting party. 9' However, this duty is
firmly grounded in specific enabling legislation and cannot be lightly
extended to other businesses.
Furthermore, the duty of a public utility to the citizenry generally
92
adheres even in the absence of a contract and extends beyond the contract.
The lack of a quasi-public duty upon insurers is underscored by courts'
reluctance to extend the insurer's duty of good faith beyond the contract.
So far, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has strictly limited the tort to the
parties to an insurance contract. 93

A particular case on point is Allstate Insurance Co. v. Amick, 94 in which

injured third parties were not allowed to sue the liability insurer who

refused to settle with them in good faith. These innocent injured parties
were the members of the public that mandatory liability
intended to protect. 9s If the insurer's duty of good faith
quasi-public, extra-contractual duty, the presence or absence
with the injured parties would be irrelevant. Instead, the
insurer's duty does not extend beyond the contract indicates
a quasi-public duty.

insurance is
were truly a
of a contract
fact that the
that it is not

See also Piggee v. Mercy Hosp., 199 Okla. 411, 186 P.2d 817, 818 (1947) (implied contracts
"may be enforced by an action ex contractu"). Piggee was quoted with approval in the
present context by Justice Opala's dissent in Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 60 OKLA. B.J. 305, 310

(1989).
91. See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768 (1939).
92. See id. at 770.
93. See Roach v. Atlas Ins. Co., 60 OKLA. B.J. 537 (1989) (third-party beneficiary to
life insurance policy can recover); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984)
(injured third parties could not recover from insurance company which refused to settle with
them); Scivally v. Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1983) (no duty to process application
promptly). But see 36 OKLA. STAT. 1241 (Supp. 1987) (if insurer does not process application
or return premium within 45 days, insurer is liable for the coverage which the premium
would have covered).
In Gruenberg, the court refused to extend the tort liability to the insurance adjusting firm
and the law firm which acted as agents of the insurer. Because these firms were not parties
to the actual contract, they could not be liable for breach of the duty of good faith.
Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1038-39. More recently, innocent insureds have been denied recovery
because of misrepresentations of adjusters acting on their behalf. See O'Donnell, Imputation
of Fraud and Bad Faith: The Role of the Public Adjuster, Co-Insured and Independent
Adjuster, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 662 (1987).
94. 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984). See also Wilson v. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349 (Okla. 1988)
(insurance contract is not for the benefit of injured third parties).
95. See Duff v. Alliance Mut. Casualty Co., 296 F.2d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 1961) ("The
[Oklahoma Safety Responsibility Act] does of course reflect a public policy to afford financial
protection to injured parties by requiring [liability insurance]."); Hibdon v. Casualty Corp.
of Am., 504 P.2d 878, 882 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972) (purpose of Oklahoma Safety Responsibility
Act is "to make drivers and owners responsible for injury or loss they cause to any person").
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Fourth, courts emphasize that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion in which insurers have unfair bargaining power. However, as the
Gruenberg dissent noted, the terms of Gruenberg's fire insurance policy
had been been written by the state legislature and imposed upon both
parties by state law. 9 Presumably, the legislature had carefully weighed
both positions. 97 Likewise, fire insurance policies in Oklahoma must adhere
to a form contract.98
Moreover, courts extend the tort to commercial insurance contracts
which frequently are arms-length transactions.99 The statutes which require
the insurer's promise to pay promptly'00 do not apply to these commercial
insurance transactions, in which the insureds may bargain through their
attorneys or other experienced professionals. Adhesion and unfair bargaining power are not a significant factor in these commercial contracts.
In addition, adhesion and unfair bargaining power are problems of
contract formation and interpretation, not of contract performance. Insurance codes address adhesion and bargaining power in their regulation
of contract terms. Statutes which prescribe that certain terms be included
in insurance contracts may go to the heart of the adhesion problem.
Metropolitan affirms that the duty to form a contract according to statutory requirements is extra-contractual and can be the basis for a tort.
But Allis-Chalmers and Pilot Life affirm that an action for nonperformance of a contract term does not address these policy concerns.
Finally, courts note that insureds buy insurance to avoid risk while
insurers are in the business of risk-taking.' 0' This argument ignores the
fact that all contracts involve risk by both parties. Protection from unforeseen circumstances is a feature of many commercial contracts, including, for example, the common "line of credit" revolving credit plan or
ordinary consumer credit card. If instead the courts are emphasizing that
the losses the insured suffers when the insurer delays payment are the
same losses he sought to insure against, then the obvious solution is to
acknowledge that these losses may, and should, be addressed by contractual
compensatory damages. 02
The result of this reasoning is confusion. Courts generally recognize that
the duty of good faith is separate from other contract duties, such as the
duty to pay money. 03 Either duty may be breached independently of the
96. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 2070-71 (West 1972).
97. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1043.
98. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 4803 (Supp. 1985). The Oklahoma Supreme Court extended the
tort to all insurance contracts in McCorkle v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583 (Okla.
1981), which involved a fire insurance contract. A predecessor to the present section 4803
was in effect at that time.
99. See McCorkle, 637 P.2d 583 (Okla. 1981), in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court
extended the tort liability to all insurance contracts.
100. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 4405(A)(8), 4505 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
101. See, e.g., Christian, 577 P.2d at 902.
102. See Note, Contracts: Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank: Reevaluating the "Christian"
Principle of Tort Liabilityfor Breach of Good Faith, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 291 (1989).
103. See, e.g., Lueck, 342 N.W.2d at 707.
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other, or they may be breached together.' 0 4 But courts err in reasoning
that because the duties are different, one is in contract and the other is
in tort. That reasoning is analogous to reasoning that because an apple is
not an orange, it cannot be a fruit.
The Effects of the Flaw
Because the tort/contract characterization is normally a matter of state
law, Allis-Chalmers is precedent only in the preemption context. 0 5 Therefore, Gruenberg and Christian are still good law.' 0 6 Nonetheless, the
seriously flawed reasoning of these cases becomes apparent as courts
attempt to justify applying tort liability in one contract, but not in another.
Recognition of the flaw could lead to better-reasoned cases in the future.
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has refused to extend the tort
to two types of non-insurance contracts: commercial lending contracts and
employment-at-will contracts. On its face, the limitation is illogical.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the commercial lending contract in Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank.'0 7 More than any other single Oklahoma case, Rodgers exemplifies the need for a critical reexamination of
the Christian principle of tort liability for breach of the duty of good
faith in light of Allis-Chalmers. Rodgers is consistent with Allis-Chalmers,
but Rodgers cannot be reconciled with Christian. Banks may be more
quasi-public than insurance companies. Commercial insurance customers
may be as sophisticated as commercial lending customers. Individual consumers may be just as vulnerable with their bankers as they are with their
insurers.' 08
104. For example, bad-faith delayed payment is a breach of good faith, but not a breach
of the duty to pay money. Good-faith nonpayment of money may be a breach of the duty
to pay money, but not a breach of good faith. Bad-faith refusal to pay money may be a
breach of both duties.
105. The California Supreme Court acknowledged the preemptive effect of Pilot Life for
violation of even the statutory duty to pay insurance proceeds promptly in Commercial Life
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 473, 764 P.2d 1059, 253 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 2087 (1989). The Ninth Circuit held similarly in Kanne v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3216 (1989).
106. See supra note 45.
107. 756 P.2d 1223 (1988).
108. The Rodgers decision and its juxtaposition to Christian are critically examined in
Note, Contracts: Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank: Reevaluating the "Christian Principle" of
Tort Liability for Breach of Good Faith, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (1989). See generally Pierce
& Harrell, Financersas Fiduciaries:An Examination of Recent Trends in Lender Liability,
42 OKLA. L. REV. 79 (1989); Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n and Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, Critical
Issues in Today's Banking, Pub. No. 309, Sept. 16, 1988 (recent developments); Bahls,
Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liability, 48 MONT. L.
REV. 213 (1987) (application of the principle to acceleration, demands for more collateral,
loan negotiations); Flick & Replansky, Liability of Banks to their Borrowers: Pitfalls and
Protections, 103 BANKINo L.J. 220 (1986) (definition of the liability); Lawrence & Wilson,
Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63
IND. L. J. 825 (1988) (application of U.C.C. Art. I good faith definition to banks); Note,
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing and the Implied Duty of Good
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Just as the commercial lending contract is logically indistinguishable
from the commercial insurance contract, other kinds of contracts may be
similarly indistinguishable. For example, the consumer lending contract,
the attorney-client fee contract, and the real estate contract could be
vulnerable to "judicial excursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith."' 0 9 As a Ninth Circuit judge remarked, this tort "throws kerosene
on the litigation bonfire by holding out the allure of punitive damages, a
golden carrot that entices into court0 parties who might otherwise be
inclined to resolve their differences.""
At another extreme, the Oklahoma Supreme Court apparently does not
recognize that the duty of good faith is not a threat to employment-atwill."' Simply put, if there is no duty to retain an employee, there can be
no duty to retain the employee in good faith. Anxious to assure that the
tort does not nullify employment-at-will in Oklahoma, the court declared,
"We reject the implication of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing
in every employment-at-will contract."" 2 This holding violates one of the
basic tenets of contract law. Both the employee and the employer have
the right to expect the duties which are a part of the contract to be
performed in good faith. For example, even an employee at will has the
right to timely payment for his services.
Confusion over the definition of the duty extends to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's treatment of wrongful dismissal (of employees) in violation of public policy. Some justices appear not to recognize that this
dismissal is not breach of the contract duty of good faith.' Instead, it is
a violation of a public policy separate from the contract.
Ironically, this violation of public policy is separate from the contract
in exactly the same way that courts would have breach of the duty of
good faith be separate. Although it may arise from the same facts as the
contract, the question of liability can be decided without interpreting the

Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 539 (1987) (subjective and objective good faith obligations under
the U.C.C.); Harrell, The Bank-Customer Relationship: Evolution of a Modern Form, I I
OKLA. CITy U.L. Rv. 641 (1986) (detrimental reliance may be the focus of the expanding
tort).
109. Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 554 (Okla. 1987).
110. Oki Am. Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski,
J., concurring).
111. See generally Note, Employers and Employees: Hinson v. Cameron: Dimming the
"Hall Light" on Oklahoma's "Revised" Employment-at-Will Doctrine?, 41 OKLA. L. REv.
314 (1988); Note, Employment-at-Will and Wrongful Discharge in Oklahoma, 23 TULSA L.
J. 495 (1988); Tepker, Oklahoma's At-Will Rule: Heeding the Warnings of America's
Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 373 (1976).
112. Burk v. K-Mart, Inc., 60 OKLA. B.J. 305, 306 (1989).
113. In Burk, the majority held that dismissal in violation of public policy could be heard
in tort as an "exception" to the general rule. Id. at 307. Justices Opala and Lavender would
have the "exception" sound in contract unless the dismissal was accompanied by malice,
negligence or reckless indifference. Id. at 308-09. Justice Simms would have the action sound
in contract if at all. Id. at 311.
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contract. Because the action for dismissal in violation of public policy
does not lie in contract, tort liability is the only appropriate remedy.
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court were to adopt the reasoning of Allis14
Chalmers, Metropolitan, and Pilot Life, insureds could still be protected .
A recent statute protecting insureds did not exist when Christian was
decided." 5 In addition, contract remedies could be interpreted more broadly
to protect those who need protection without blurring the traditional
6
distinction between tort and contract."
Conclusion
The duty of good faith is an implied contractual duty to perform the
expressed contract duties in good faith. It is imposed by statute in some
contracts; it is implied by the common law in all contracts. Because the
duty does not extend beyond the contract, it is not a quasi-public duty.
According to the United States Supreme Court, any connection between
tort liability for breach of this duty and the policy concerns inherent in
the insurer/insured relationship is "attenuated at best." The Court also
determined that the duty of good faith has no element outside the contract
upon which to base tort liability.
Failure to recognize the purely contractual nature of the duty has led
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to render poorly reasoned decisions in other
areas of the law. Because tort liability for breach of this duty violates
traditional distinctions between tort and contract, the tort threatens the
entire system of contract law relationships. Therefore, Christian should be
overruled.
Carolyn S. Smith

114. See Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988).
115. See 36

OKLA. STAT. §

1219 (1986).

116. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
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